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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: OLD HABITS
LINGER ON
R. BRENT DANIEL*
During the calendar year of 1980, 238 out of a total of 1,586 ap-
peals commenced in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit were from judgments in criminal cases. I There were forty-
two related appeals taken from habeas corpus determinations. 2 While
the Seventh Circuit reversed judgments in approximately 28.4 percent
of the civil appeals, it reversed only 9.3 percent of the criminal ap-
peals.3 In the nine month period between January and September of
1980, 33.4 percent of the Seventh Circuit's dispositions were reported in
published opinions; 36.3 percent were disposed of pursuant to circuit
rule 35 as unpublished orders which may not be cited as precedent in
other cases; and 30.4 percent were dismissed or disposed of pursuant to
various other orders. 4 In last year's survey of the Seventh Circuit's
criminal law and procedure decisions, circuit rule 35 was examined
with regard to the practice of reissuing "unpublished orders" as pub-
lished opinions.5 While that practice remains an area of concern, it will
not be addressed in this article since the issue is now pending on a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
6
This article will survey a number of the Seventh Circuit's decisions
* B.S., Bradley University; J.D., University of Puget Sound; member of the California and
Illinois Bars.
1. REPORT OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT




5. Flaxman, Criminal Law and Procedure. Recent Trends in the Seventh Circuit, 57 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 137, 137 n.7, 138-41 (1981).
6. Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 80-2291 (7th Cir. April 30, 1981) (unreported), petition
for cert. fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1981). In Goldberg, the trial court refused to
submit special interrogatories to the jury regarding the "obviousness" issue in a patent infringe-
ment case. On appeal, the appellee, Medtronic, relied heavily upon another district court opinion,
Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 279 (N.D. Ill. 1978),
which presented what it characterized as a "uniquely similar fact situation." Brief for Appellee at
36, Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 80-2291 (7th Cir. April 30, 1981). Medtronic was unaware,
however, that the Hancock decision had been reversed by the Seventh Circuit in an unpublished
order holding that the "obviousness" issue is one of fact. The appellant moved to have the Sev-
enth Circuit's unpublished order reversing Hancock reissued as a published opinion or, in the
alternative, for leave to rely upon the unpublished order at oral argument. The motion was de-
nied, and the decision of the Goldberg trial court, although controverted by the Seventh Circuit's
unpublished reversal of Hancock, was itself affirmed by unpublished order. In its petition for
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regarding substantive federal criminal law and will examine the court's
approach to certain criminal procedure issues during the 1980-81 term.
Since these facets of the criminal justice system have a tendency to
overlap, the substantive issues, although somewhat disparate, will be
addressed in one section. The procedural issues will then be addressed
in a separate section. This article is not intended to be an exhaustive
exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of the Seventh Circuit's
approach to criminal law and procedure issues, and it should be con-
sidered as more in the nature of a journalistic survey of the 1980-81
term. However, as will become apparent, even a cursory examination
of the court's opinions reveals a strong disposition to remain tied to the
highly conservative approach which is characteristic of the Seventh
Circuit's prior terms.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
This section will deal with the Seventh Circuit's task of construing
and applying legislative enactments in a variety of situations. In two
noteworthy decisions this term, the court explored the contours of fed-
eral conspiracy law.7 The court also had occasion to interpret sections
of the federal conffict of interest law,8 the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act,9 and the federal Gun Control Act.' 0 In addition, the court
interpreted the "sanctions" provision of the Speedy Trial Act."
Conspiracy
In United States v. Castro,12 the court considered the double jeop-
ardy bar against multiple prosecutions for the same offense in connec-
tion with multiple narcotics conspiracy charges. The court abandoned
the traditional "same evidence" test that it had previously used in
United States v. Buonomo, ' 3 at least for purposes of narcotics conspir-
acy cases, and adopted an approach in which the court looks to "both
the indictments and the evidence and consider[s] such factors as
whether the conspiracies involve the same time period, alleged co-con-
certiorari, the petitioner argues that the Seventh Circuit has nullified the principle of stare decisis
and denied the petitioner its right to trial by jury.
7. United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Payne, 635 F.2d
643 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2050 (1981).
8. United States v. Irons, 640 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1981).
9. United States v. Gannon, No. 80-1108 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3300 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1981).
10. United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1980).
11. United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1980).
12. 629 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1980).
13. 441 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971).
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spirators and places, overt acts, and whether the conspiracies depend
upon each other for success" 14 in order to determine whether a conspir-
acy has been subdivided arbitrarily, resulting in multiple indictments
for a single illegal agreement. This approach had previously been
adopted by the Fifth Circuit.'
5
In Castro, two undercover Puerto Rican police officers and an in-
formant met with Castro at his bar in Las Hoyas, Puerto Rico. Castro
was asked for help in locating a heroin connection in Chicago. Castro
gave the officers the name and Chicago address of "Johnny El Loco."
The officers later met with Castro's stepson, Carlos Ramos. Ra-
mos offered to take the officers to Chicago to purchase two kilos of
heroin that were supposed to be available there. At the San Juan Inter-
national Airport, the officers told Ramos that they would introduce
their "money man" to him in Chicago, and Ramos agreed to introduce
"El Loco" to the money man. Upon arrival in Chicago, Ramos was
introduced to another Puerto Rican police officer who purported to be
the money man. Ramos was unable to contact "El Loco" but was
eventually able to provide a kilo of heroin from another source identi-
fied as "Alejo" in a deal set up by a man known as "Acapulco Joe."
This transaction occurred on September 29, 1977. Two days later, the
officers expressed to Ramos a desire to obtain an additional five or ten
kilos of heroin. Ramos agreed, and it was arranged that he would con-
tact the undercover officers in Puerto Rico when the connection had
been made.
The officers then visited Castro at his bar and, complaining of Ra-
mos' poor performance, urged Castro to travel to Chicago to arrange
this transaction. Castro declined because of legal restrictions on his
travel. However, on October 28, 1977, Castro told the officers that he
would call Ramos and tell him to arrange a sale in Chicago. On No-
vember 1, 1977, the officers returned to Chicago. Ramos met the of-
ficers and took them to Aurora, Illinois, where he introduced them to a
man named Perez. Perez sold five kilos of heroin to the officers.'
6
Castro was among those subsequently arrested and was charged in
two indictments, issued approximately three weeks apart, with conspir-
acy to distribute heroin 17 and distribution of heroin.' 8 The first indict-
ment on which he was tried had been issued on February 2, 1978, and
14. 629 F.2d at 461.
15. See United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. 629 F.2d at 458-60.
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
18. See id. § 841(a)(1).
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charged Castro with the Aurora distribution of five kilos and a conspir-
acy with Perez covering the period from September 1977 through Feb-
ruary 1978. On July 28, 1978, following a jury trial, Castro was found
not guilty on both counts.
The other indictment, issued on January 12, 1978, alleged that
Castro had engaged in a conspiracy with Alejo, Ramos and Acapulco
Joe beginning in the summer of 1977 and continuing until the Novem-
ber 1977 arrests. Castro moved to dismiss the charges against him on
the grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The motions
were denied, and Castro was convicted.' 9
In considering the double jeopardy issue on appeal, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the traditional Buonomo test--the "same evidence
test"2 0-is insufficient to prevent multiple prosecutions in narcotics
conspiracy cases because the prosecution can shape the overt acts
charged in each indictment "and thus, under the guise of prosecutorial
discretion, advance the proposition of one conspiracy's being capable
of proof in several prosecutions requiring different evidence for each
conviction. ' '2 ' Applying the principles utilized in United States v.
Marable,22 the court found that both conspiracies involved the same
"core conspirators," one collective agreement to distribute heroin, the
same place of distribution, the same time period, and the same methods
of operation. 23 The only distinction was that the conspiracies involved
different suppliers. This distinction was held to be insufficient to estab-
lish multiple conspiracies, and Castro's conspiracy conviction was re-
versed on double jeopardy grounds. 24 This new approach by the court
appears to be a sound step forward from the outmoded Buonomo rule.
In another case, the Seventh Circuit examined the scope of con-
spiracy prosecutions in connection with statute of limitations consider-
ations. In United States v. Payne,25 the defendant was charged in only
one count of a twelve count indictment involving several co-defend-
ants. Payne was convicted under the general conspiracy statute26 of
19. 629 F.2d at 460.
20. See 441 F.2d 922 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971).
21. 629 F.2d at 461.
22. 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978).
23. 629 F.2d at 463.
24. Id. at 465. The court further found that since no evidence of the September 29, 1977,
transaction was admitted at the first trial, the Government was not collaterally estopped from
prosecuting the substantive count of the second indictment. However, since the conspfracy evi-
dence was improperly before the jury, a remand on the substantive count was necessary. Id. at
466.
25. 635 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2050 (1981).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The statute provides:
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conspiring to cause the transportation of stolen motor vehicles from
Kentucky to Indiana in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and to receive,
conceal and sell such vehicles in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. Payne's
co-defendants all entered pleas of guilty before the case was submitted
to the jury.
The conspiracy count against Payne alleged nineteen overt acts.
Overt acts eleven through fifteen were withdrawn from jury considera-
tion.27 The first ten overt acts were alleged to have occurred between
January and May of 1974-outside the five year period before August
22, 1979, when the indictment was returned.2 8 Overt acts sixteen
through nineteen were alleged to have occurred in May of 1978.
Payne contended that the 1978 overt acts constituted a separate
conspiracy and could not be used to reactivate a conspiracy that had
been nonexistent since 1974. But the court reasoned that since the par-
ties had contemplated a continuing relationship based on the supply
and demand of stolen cars, the conspiracy had continued despite the
fact that no additional acts in furtherance of the original 1974 conspir-
acy were committed until after the statute of limitations had run.29 Re-
lying on United States v. Nowak 30 which held that the duration and
identity of a conspiracy depends upon its terms,3' the court affirmed
Payne's conviction. The Nowak decision, however, is distinguishable,
and the court's conclusion in Payne is questionable.
Nowak involved a conspiracy to misapply federally insured funds
and to make fraudulent statements to an agency of the United States.
Unlike Payne, the Nowak conspiracy required the defendants to rou-
tinely give false answers to questions by federal regulatory examiners.
It is fair to infer from the nature of the transaction involved that the
Nowak conspirators contemplated the necessity of this ongoing pattern
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspir-
acy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
27. This apparently was because these acts involved only the co-defendants who were no
longer on trial.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried,
or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the informa-
tion is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.
29. 635 F.2d at 645.
30. 448 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 139.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
of fictitious statements. Unlike the situation in Nowak, there is no ap-
parent indication in Payne that the conspiracy existed or that acts in
furtherance of it occurred from its termination in 1974 until 1978. Yet,
the jury was presented with evidence dating back to 1974 to prove the
alleged offense.
The Payne court has extended the rule in Nowak dangerously
close to conflicting with the established rule that, once the object of a
conspiracy has been attained, the conspiracy terminates and no subsidi-
ary conspiracy to conceal the crime may be inferred from evidence
showing merely that the conspirators took steps to avoid apprehen-
sion.32 Although the 1978 overt acts alleged in Payne do not relate to
the attempted concealment of a previous conspiracy, it seems that the
potential for abuse in the admission of evidence and the possibility of
prosecutorial overreaching which may flow from Payne warrant a
closer examination. Since a co-conspirator may engage in conduct ar-
guably related to a long dormant conspiracy at any time without a de-
fendant's knowledge-thus reactivating the dormant conspiracy
according to Payne--conspiracy prosecutions conceivably might never
be barred by the statute of limitations.
Federal Conflict of Interest Law
In United States v. Irons,33 the Seventh Circuit interpreted the fed-
eral conflict of interest law34 in a manner which also seems to leave the
efficacy of the statute of limitations in some doubt.
In late 1973, Irons was employed as an Education Program Direc-
tor for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. As part of
his duties, Irons had supervisory responsibility over several educational
programs funded by HEW. Irons was authorized to recommend action
to the directors of these educational programs, particularly in the for-
32. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 399-406 (1957).
33. 640 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1981).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1976). The statute provides:
Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or employee
of the executive branch of the United States Government, of any independent agency of
the United States, or of the District of Columbia, including a special Government em-
ployee, participates personally and substantially as a Government officer or employee,
through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, in-
vestigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other preceeding, application, request for a
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or
other particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, partner,
organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, partner or employee, or
any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement con-
cerning prospective employment, has a financial interest-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
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mation of program budgets.35
In December of 1973, Irons met with the director of one of the
programs he supervised to discuss the budget. The director had allo-
cated a sum for audio-visual equipment in his proposed budget, and
Irons recommended that this amount be increased. The budget was
amended as suggested and, in April of 1974, the program received a
grant from HEW which included $13,000 for audio-visual equipment.
Irons then suggested to the program director that Advance Photo and
Sounds (APS) be invited to bid on the contract for the audio-visual
equipment.
APS did submit a bid, and the program director subsequently ac-
cepted the APS bid in September of 1974. Unknown to the program
director was that APS had never done business as an audio-visual
equipment supplier; that the man whom Irons had told him to deal
with at APS was an assistant director of a funeral home who was a
long-time friend of Irons, who owned no interest in APS, and who had
never been involved in the audio-visual equipment business; and that
Irons was associated with APS. The program director paid APS
$12,855 for the audio-visual equipment and delivered a check for that
amount, payable to APS, to Irons' home. Irons then purchased the
equipment for APS from another supplier in September of 1974, and
the program director picked up the equipment at Irons' home several
weeks later.
In May of 1974, the director of another educational program su-
pervised by Irons sought his advice regarding disposition of a budget
surplus. Irons recommended the purchase of audio-visual equipment
and suggested that APS could give a "good price." The program direc-
tor purchased $3,120 worth of audio-visual equipment from APS on
May 14, 1974. The equipment was delivered on August 28, 1974, and
the director gave Irons a check for the purchase price the next day.
On August 29, 1979, Irons was indicted for violating the federal
conflict of interest law. 36 Irons moved to quash the indictment on the
ground that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. 37
Count One of the indictment read:
From in or about September 1973, to in or about January 1975,
Louis Irons ... knowingly participated personally and substan-
tially as a Government employee through recommendation, the ren-
dering of advice, causing delivery to be made of equipment,
35. 640 F.2d at 873,
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See note 28 supra.
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receiving payment of monies for such equipment, and otherwise, in a
contract and matter between Enrichment Learning . . . and Ad-
vance Photo and Sounds . . . in which company, to his knowledge,
he had a financial interest.
38
Irons contended that any actions proscribed by the statute had occurred
prior to July 1, 1974. He also contended that the "causing delivery to
be made" and "receiving payment" language had been inserted into the
indictment merely to bring the case within the statute of limitations.
39
The Government responded that Irons' later conduct fell within the "or
otherwise" catchall language of the statute.
40
The issue, therefore, was how to properly interpret the phrase "or
otherwise" in the statute. The court rejected Irons' argument that the
doctrine of eusdem generis4' should be applied and proceeded to ex-
amine the predecessor statutes and the legislative history of the conflict
of interest statute. For almost one hundred years, said the court, the
predecessor conflict of interest statutes had proscribed participation by
a government employee in the "transaction of business" with any entity
in which he had a personal financial interest.42 Examining the legisla-
tive history, including the House and Senate reports,43 the Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the congressional intent in enacting the present law
had been to broaden the scope of the prior conflict of interest provi-
sion.44 As a result, Irons' participation in the delivery of the equipment
and the receipt of payments for it as an agent of APS was considered
part of the offense, and his conviction was affirmed.
While it is clear from the congressional reports that Congress did
intend to broaden the scope of the federal conflict of interest statute, a
close reading of those reports indicates that only "significant participa-
tion in government action" or "participating on behalf of the Govern-
ment" was intended to be encompassed. 45 It appears that Irons'
38. 640 F.2d at 874 (court's emphasis omitted). The court discussed only the first count of the
indictment, noting that the same analysis applied to the second count. 640 F.2d at 8 n.7.
39. Id. at 874.
40. Id. at 875.
41. The rule ofejusdem generis is a principle of statutory construction that limits the scope of
a general term in a statute to the same general class as preceding specific terms. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979). The court noted that in this case the general term "or otherwise"
would have to be limited to matters preliminary to the formation of the contract. 640 F.2d at 875-
76.
42. 640 F.2d at 876 (citing 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863), as amended, 35 Stat. 1088, 1097 (1909), as
amended, 62 Stat. 683, 703 (1948), as amended, 76 Stat. 1119, 1124 (1962)).
43. H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3852.
44. 640 F.2d at 878.
45. For example, the portion of the House report quoted by the court in Irons reads:
Section 208 supplants 18 U.S.C. § 434 which disqualifies government officials who are
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conduct in "causing delivery" and "receiving payment" did not occur
in his capacity as a government employee, but rather in his capacity as
an agent of APS.
In his incisive dissent, Judge Dumbauld of the District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation on the Sev-
enth Circuit, concluded that the crime was complete when Irons recom-
mended the purchase of equipment from his firm.46 This appears to be
the better view. Like the Payne decision, Irons will impose constant
unease and fear upon potential indictees, perhaps rehabilitated and re-
pentant, by attenuating the relief which is supposed to be assured by
the statute of limitations.
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
The Seventh Circuit's statutory interpretation took an interesting
turn in United States v. Gannon .4 7 Gannon involved one of the first
pecuniarily interested in business entities from transacting business with such entity on
behalf of the Government. Section 208(a) would prohibit not merely 'transacting busi-
ness' with a business entity in which the government employee is interested but would
bar any significant participation in government action in the consequences of which to
his knowledge the employee has a financial interest.
H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1961). The portion of the Senate report quoted by the
court reads:
[Siubsection (a) improves upon the present law [§ 4341 by abandoning the limiting
concept of the 'transaction of business.' The disqualification of the subsection embraces
any participation on behalf of the Government in a matter in which the employee has an
outside financial interest, even though his participation does not involve the transaction
of business.
S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3852, 3862.
46. 640 F.2d at 879 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting). As Judge Dumbauld stated:
It is plain that [Irons] violated 1 U.S.C. 208 ....
However, in my opinion, his criminal conduct was perpetrated more than five years
before the indictment was returned on August 29, 1979, and prosecution is thus pre-
cluded by the statute of limitations (18 U.S.C. 3282).
The crime was completed when [Irons] recommended the purchase of equipment
from his firm. He would have been guilty even if his subordinate had rejected his sug-
gestion and had purchased from a competitor. His subsequent actions in delivering mer-
chandise or collecting payment (which the Government relies on to avoid the statute of
limitations) might perhaps be regarded as acting (under the other hat of his conflicting
capacities) as agent of the seller rather than "as a Government officer or employee" on
behalf of the buyer. In any event such action is not an element of the crime as defined by
Congress. If the equipment broke down ten years later, and appellant repaired it, such
conduct would hardly be thought adequate to serve as a basis for prosecution at that late
date; but the reasoning of the majority of the panel would lead to that result.
The words "or otherwise" should be interpreted under the rule of e/usdem generis.
They obviously refer to other modes of exerting influence or pressure upon the govern-
ment agency to favor the seller in which appellant has a financial interest. They do not
include within the crime mere ministerial conduct on the part of the seller in performing
a contract. The majority opinion places on those two words a burden heavier than they
can support.
47. No. 80-1108 (7th Cir. Nov. 3, 1980) (unreported), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S.
Oct. 20, 1981).
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criminal prosecutions under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974.48 The defendant was charged with twenty-nine counts of ac-
cepting payments in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b).
49
At the time of his indictment, Gannon was employed as a counter-
man in the Torrens office of the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. His
function was to receive documents for Torrens registration along with a
statutory fee, which would be given to a cashier in return for a stamped
receipt which would then be given to the customer. Employees of vari-
ous banks and savings and loan associations would customarily give
two or three dollars in addition to the statutory fees to the defendant
because they believed they received prompt service in return for the
gratuities. Gannon was found guilty on twenty-eight counts of violat-
ing RESPA by accepting the extra payments. On appeal, he contended
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as RESPA].
49. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (1976) provides:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of
any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service in con-
nection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other than for
services actually performed.
RESPA also prohibits kickbacks in connection with certain real estate settlement services:
No person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing of value
pursuant to any agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to
or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan
shall be referred to any person.
Id. § 2607(a). And the penalties for violations of these provisions can be severe:
(1) Any person or persons who violate the provisions of this section shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2) In addition to the penalties provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection, any
person or persons who violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be
jointly and severally liable to the person or persons whose business has been referred in
an amount equal to three times the value or amount of the fee or thing of value, and any
person or persons who violate the provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall be
jointly and severally liable to the person or persons charged for the settlement services
involved in an amount equal to three times the amount of the portion, split, or percent-
age. In any successful action to enforce the liability under this paragraph, the court may
award the court costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as deter-
mined by the court.
Id. § 2607(d). However, the statute clearly sets out several broad classes of payments which are
outside its prohibitions:
Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting (1) the payment of a fee (A)
to attorneys at law for services actually rendered or (B) by a title company to its duly
appointed agent for services actually performed in the issuance of a policy of title insur-
ance or (C) by a lender to its duly appointed agent for services actually performed in the
making of a loan, (2) the payment to any person of a bona fide salary or compensation or
other payment for goods or facilities actually furnished or for services actually per-
formed, or (3) payments pursuant to co-operative brokerage and referral arrangements
or agreements between real estate agents and brokers, or (4) such other payments or
classes of payments or other transfers as are specified in regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, after consultation with the Attorney General, the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of
Agriculture.
Id. § 2607(c).
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that although he accepted the gratuities, he did not violate section
2607(b) because the gratuities were not a portion of what he received
for rendering the services. The Seventh Circuit agreed. The court
noted that both the indictment and the Government's trial memoran-
dum stated that the payments Gannon had received were other than for
services he actually performed. Since the gratuities received were not
for the rendering of real estate services, they could not be considered a
portion of the charges for unperformed real estate service. The court
apparently assumed that, although the gratuities were a customary part
of doing business, the institutions involved altruistically shouldered the
burden of paying an extra two or three dollars per transaction and ig-
nored these costs in determining their "charges." The court concluded
that the rule of statutory construction requiring criminal statutes to be
strictly construed mandated this conclusion.50 The court observed that
the legislative history of RESPA indicated that it was aimed at abusive
practices in the conveyancing industry, primarily at kickback and refer-
ral fee arrangements, and not at local government employees who ac-
cept gratuities.
This construction of a statute which was obviously intended to ex-
pand federal jurisdiction over local corruption, stands in stark contrast
to the Seventh Circuit's broad interpretations of the Hobbs Act,51 par-
ticularly the notion of finding federal jurisdiction based on nothing
more than a remote potentiality that a particular act will affect inter-
state commerce.5 2 In Gannon, it could easily be argued that since the
gratuities were customary in the industry, they were ultimately passed
on to consumers when institutions set their fees and thus became a
"portion" of an institution's "charges."
Federal Gun Control Act
In the case of United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rfle,53 the Sev-
enth Circuit strictly construed section 922(e) of the federal Gun Con-
trol Act.5 4 The appeal arose from the district court's granting of the
Government's motion for summary judgment in a forfeiture action.55
50. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
52. See United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Staszcuk, 517
F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc), modfying 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974). See generaly Flaxman,
supra note 5, at 146-48.
53. 629 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
55. 629 F.2d at 1251. The forfeiture action was based on section 924(d) of the Gun Control
Act which provides in pertinent part:
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The Government had relied on alleged violations of two provisions of
the Gun Control Act in making two motions for summary judgment in
the district court.
On July 18, 1976, Don McBain landed at Chicago's O'Hare Air-
port on board a Delta Airlines flight from Florida. While in Florida,
McBain had been "loaned" the defendant rifle by Sam Puleo, a con-
victed felon. Before boarding the flight, McBain had delivered the
weapon to "agents" of the airline and had informed them of its nature.
After disembarking, McBain failed to recover the rifle from Delta, and
it was subsequently seized by federal officials at the airport. McBain at
that time did not possess an Illinois Firearms Owner's Identification
Card. Nor was McBain a federally licensed importer, manufacturer,
dealer, or collector of firearms.
The Government's first motion for summary judgment was
grounded on McBain's alleged violation of section 922(e) of the Gun
Control Act.56 It was uncontested that McBain had not provided Delta
Airlines with written notice that he was giving them a firearm for trans-
port. The question was whether McBain had complied with the pro-
viso permitting a passenger to avoid a violation of the law by delivering
a firearm into the custody of the pilot, captain, conductor, or operator
of a common or contract carrier for the duration of the trip. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, despite the Government's argument that
McBain had failed to specifically allege delivery of the rifle to the pilot
or other individual named in the proviso, holding that while McBain's
pleadings lacked clarity, his conduct at least arguably fell within the
scope of the statutory language, thus leaving a genuine issue of material
fact to be determined.
The Government's second motion for summary judgment was
based on section 922(a)(3) of the Gun Control Act.57 The district court
Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used or intended to be used in, any viola-
tion of the provisions of this chapter ... shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture ....
56. 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to deliver or cause to be delivered to
any common or contract carrier for transportation or shipment in interstate or foreign
commerce, to persons other than licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, licensed
dealers, or licensed collectors, any package or other container in which there is any fire-
arm or ammunition without written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammuni-
tion is being transported or shipped; except that any passenger who owns or legally
possesses a firearm or ammunition being transported aboard any common or contract
carrier for movement with the passenger in interstate or foreign commerce may deliver
said firearm or ammunition into the custody of the pilot, captain, conductor or operator
of such common or contract carrier for the duration of the trip without violating any of
the provisions of this chapter.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (1976) provides that it is unlawful
for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
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accepted the Government's argument that no genuine issue of material
fact existed with regard to McBain's alleged violation of this section
and granted the motion.
On McBain's appeal, despite the fact that the district court had
denied the Government's motion based on section 922(e), the Seventh
Circuit began by addressing the issue of McBain's compliance with sec-
tion 922(e).58 The court assumed that a statement by McBain's attor-
ney in the district court that "[McBain] does not yet know the name of
the baggage clerk who was told that the weapon was being presented
for transport" constituted an admission that the rifle had not been de-
livered into the hands of the airline's pilot, as would be required by a
strict interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, the court framed the
first issue as "whether delivery of the firearm to an airline baggage
clerk, instead of a pilot, is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute
compliance" with section 922(e).
59
The court reasoned that since the statute is penal, it should be
strictly construed against the Government.6° The court then reviewed
the Act's legislative history and concluded that the purpose of section
922(e) is to permit the lawful transportation of a firearm while insuring
that the weapon is placed under the control of the person in charge of
the trip.61 The Seventh Circuit held that "as long as a passenger deliv-
ers the firearm to a responsible agent of the airline for delivery to the
pilot with notice that it is a firearm that is being transferred, the passen-
ger has complied with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e)."' 62 Ap-
plying that principle, the court stated:
licensed collector to transport into or receive in the State where he resides (or if the
person is a corporation or other business entity, the State where it maintains a place of
business) any firearm purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State,
except that this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully acquires a
firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State other than his State of residence
from transporting the firearm into or receiving it in that State, if it is lawful for such
person to purchase or possess such firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the trans-
portation or receipt of a rifle or shotgun obtained in conformity with the provisions of
subsection (b)(3) of this section, and (C) shall not apply to the transportation of any
firearm acquired in any State prior to the effective date of this chapter ....
58. 629 F.2d at 1252. The court reasoned that
[a]lthough the district court denied the government's motion for summary judgment as to
this issue, the government has argued this theory on appeal and we may consider
whether it would constitute a basis for affirming the judgment. See, e.g., Harper Plastics,
Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 617 F.2d 468, 472 n. I1(7th Cir. 1980); Miller v. Gate-
way Transportation Co., 616 F.2d 272, 275 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1253 n.2.
59. Id. at 1253.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1254.
62. Id.
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Whether, as appears to be the case here, a baggage clerk is necessar-
ily such a responsible agent of a carrier need not be decided now.
That determination may very well depend on the facts of the particu-
lar case. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that on the record
before us we cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material fact
as to the identity and responsibility of the person to whom the re-
spondent claims to have delivered the firearm and the circumstances
and understandings accompanying that delivery.
6 3
The court, therefore, found that section 922(e) did not furnish a basis
for affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment.
Turning to the granting of summary judgment based on McBain's
alleged violation of section 922(a)(3), the Seventh Circuit found that
the legislative history of the section established that the section was not
intended to apply to transportation of a firearm between two states by a
person with residences in both states.64 Since a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to whether McBain was a resident of Florida as well
as Illinois, the judgment of the district court was reversed.
65
Speedy Trial Act
The Seventh Circuit rendered a significant decision this term re-
garding the sanctions provision of the Speedy Trial Act. 66 In United
States v. Carreon,67 the Seventh Circuit assumed for purposes of its
decision that sanctions were applicable under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)
68
for a violation of either subsection 3161(e)69 or 3161(i)70 of the Speedy
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1256-57.
65. Id. at 1257. In his response to the Government's second motion for summary judgment,
McBain asserted that he was a resident of Florida as well as Illinois because "'he owns a three flat
building in Miami Beach, Florida that he visits often and where he has an apartment set aside for
his use as a residence."' Id. at 1256. The court also noted that, in any event, the Government, as
the movant in the motion for summary judgment, had the burden of establishing that McBain was
not a resident of Florida when he obtained the rifle. The Government had failed to introduce into
the record anything tending to establish this. Id. n.6.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (1976).
67. 626 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1980).
68. 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2) (1976) provides:
If a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c)
as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on mo-
tion of the defendant. The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such
motion but the Government shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in
connection with any exclusion of time under subparagraph 3161(h)(3). In determining
whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among
others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circum-
stances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the
administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice. Failure of the de-
fendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (1976) provides:
If the defendant is to be tried again following a declaration by the trial judge of a
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Trial Act.71 The issue then became whether the trial court had erred in
applying the sanctions provision by dismissing an indictment without
prejudice rather than with prejudice.
The facts surrounding this case are complicated and somewhat bi-
zarre. The original indictment against Carreon was filed on April 10,
1975. When he failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, the case was
placed on the fugitive calendar where it remained for over a year.
When Carreon reappeared, his case was assigned to Judge Kirkland
and was set for September 2, 1976, at which time the entry of a guilty
plea was anticipated. On September 2, Judge Kirkland was unavaila-
ble, and Carreron's guilty plea hearing was held before Judge Grady.
Judge Grady refused to accept a guilty plea because the facts elicited
from Carreon showed a possible entrapment defense. On the very next
day, Carreon retendered his guilty plea to Judge Kirkland, who ac-
cepted it without detailed questioning. Carreon was sentenced to two
concurrent four year prison terms and a three year parole period.
72
On March 10, 1977, Carreon filed a petition for habeas corpus,
claiming that his guilty plea had not been voluntarily made. Summary
judgment was granted to the Government, and Carreon appealed to the
Seventh Circuit. On May 2, 1978, while his appeal was still pending,
Carreon was released on parole after serving twenty-six months in
prison. On June 14, 1978, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court and found Carreon's guilty plea defective. 73 The mandate of the
Seventh Circuit was extended until July 28, 1978 on the Government's
motion. The Government then elected not to petition for rehearing.
Because of a clerical oversight, the Seventh Circuit's mandate did not
reach the district court until four and a half months later, on December
mistrial or following an order of such judge for a new trial, the trial shall commence
within sixty days from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final. If the
defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral attack, the trial shall
commence within sixty days from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes
final, except that the court retrying the case may extend the period for retrial not to
exceed one hundred and eighty days from the date the action occasioning the retrial
becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of
time shall make trial within sixty days impractical.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(i) (1976) provides:
If trial did not commence within the time limitation specified in section 3161 be-
cause the defendant had entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere subsequently with-
drawn to any or all charges in an indictment or information, the defendant shall be
deemed indicted with respect to all charges therein contained within the meaning of
section 3161, on the day the order permitting withdrawal of the plea becomes final.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
72. 626 F.2d at 530.
73. Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978).
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5, 1978.74
On May 1, 1979, five and a half months later, Judge Bua vacated
Carreon's conviction and sentence. On June 15, 1979, Chief Judge Par-
sons granted the Government's motion to reopen the case against Car-
reon and assigned it to Judge Flaum. Arraignment was set for June 26,
but was continued until July 9, 1979 because the defendant was un-
available. Trial was set for August 27, 1979, and on July 23, 1979, Car-
reon moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice on speedy trial
grounds. While this motion was pending, a superseding indictment
was filed on August 21, 1979. On the date of trial, August 27, 1979,
Judge Flaum denied Carreon's motion for dismissal of the original in-
dictment with prejudice, ruling instead that the original indictment
should be dismissed without prejudice. Carreon proceeded immedi-
ately to a bench trial and was found guilty on all counts alleged in the
superseding indictment.
75
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit based its analysis of the propriety
of the dismissal without prejudice to the superseding indictment upon
the three factors noted in section 3162(a)(2): the seriousness of the of-
fense, the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy
Trial Act and on the administration of justice, and the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case which led to the dismissal.76 The court stated
that the defendant's crimes were serious, 7 7 adding that the "sanction of
dismissal with prejudice should therefore be imposed only for a corre-
spondingly severe delay."
78
Although it is unclear what constitutes a "severe delay" or how a
delay can correspond to the seriousness of an alleged offender's con-
duct, it is implicit in the court's opinion that it considers dismissal with
prejudice to be the exception, while dismissal without prejudice is the
normal relief for a violation of section 3161. The Seventh Circuit in
Carreon found twenty-six months of imprisonment and approximately
one additional year of jeopardy for offenses alleged to have been com-
mitted more than four years earlier an insufficient reason to invoke the
"drastic" remedy of dismissal with prejudice.
79
With regard to the second consideration--the impact of reprosecu-
74. 626 F.2d at 530.
75. Id. at 531.
76. Id. at 533.
77. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 and seven substantive counts of distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Id. at 530.
78. 626 F.2d at 533.
79. Id.
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tion on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and the administra-
tion of justice-the court concluded that any adverse impact would be
"slight." 80 This conclusion was based in part on the fact that the Gov-
ernment's neglect was never alleged to be intentional. Hence, it ap-
pears that mere negligent violations of the Act do not merit dismissal
with prejudice. The court also noted that because the "unusual circum-
stances of the case" were unlikely to recur, the prosecution would not
adversely impact the administration of either justice or the Speedy
Trial Act. 8 ' This appears to be a non sequitur.
8 2
The court found that under the third factor, the facts and circum-
stances leading to the dismissal did not warrant the extraordinary relief
of dismissal with prejudice.8 3 The court reasoned that since it, rather
than the Government, was responsible for failing to issue the mandate
until December 5, 1978 and since Carreon had not moved for issuance
of the mandate, he had no cause to complain. The court stated that the
delay between December 5, 1978, and May 30, 1979, was de minimis
because Carreon had not actively pursued his own prosecution.
84
By characterizing the dismissal with prejudice sanction as the ex-
ception rather than the rule, the Seventh Circuit has effectively ren-
dered the sanctions provisions of the Speedy Trial Act a nullity. With a
skillful choreography of superseding indictments, the prosecution ap-
parently can avoid the mandates of the Act with impunity. 85
The legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act does not support
the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit. Both the House and Senate
reports indicate that dismissals without prejudice are rarely to be
granted.
For example, the House report states:
Section 3162 provides that, in the event the time limits of the
bill, subject to the various exclusions, are not met, the court on mo-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The court's reference to the defendant's failure to claim prejudice due to the delay seems
irrelevant to any language in the Speedy Trial Act. It is, however, a well settled consideration in
determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
83. 626 F.2d at 533.
84. Id. at 534.
85. As a practical matter, except perhaps in prosecutions involving an incarcerated defend-
ant, the structure of the Speedy Trial Act rarely inures to the benefit of a defendant. The prosecu-
tion decides who and when to indict, frequently on the basis of investigations that last for months
or years and which utilize all of the vast resources of the Government. The defendant is then
given seventy days in which to prepare a defense to the Government's evidence. This can be
particularly disadvantageous in conspiracy situations, which can often involve as many as fifteen
or twenty co-defendants.
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tion of the defendant may dismiss the complaint, information or in-
dictment against the individual. This sanction applies to both the
period between indictment and trial. The effect of a dimissal would
be to bar any future prosecution against the defendant on the same
conduct. Dismissal with prejudice would apply to those offenses
which were known or reasonably should have been known at the
time of dismissal. A defendant must move to dismiss the case on
grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial has been de-
nied under the provisions of this legislation prior to trial or entry of a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or he waives the right. The dismis-
sal sanction would become effective in the fifth year after enactment
of the bill.
The dismissal sanction contained in S. 754 would permit the
reprosecution of a defendant if the attorney for the Government can
demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances. The Senate
report cites as an example of an exceptional circumstance the case
where "a defendant or his counsel perjured himself in alleging cir-
cumstances which lead a judge to dismiss charges for failing to meet
the speedy trial time limits." The report also states that exceptional
circumstances are those which the Government and the courts could
not have foreseen or avoided. [S. Rept. No. 93-1021. p.4 3 .] The
Committee believes that permitting the reprosecution of a defendant
whose case has been dismissed for failing to meet the speedy trial
time limits could result in unnecessary expenses and may have a det-
rimental impact on the grand jury system, particularly in districts
where criminal case filings are high. This danger was highlighted by
Judge Feikens in his remarks to the Subcommittee:
Another area of doubt is that engendered by a considera-
tion of the technique of the bill's (S.754) dismissal "without
prejudice". I would think if I were you, of the impact on the
grand jury system of re-indictments and the time requirements
of re-indictments. [Hearings, page 239.]
Although the Committee believes that under the Senate version it
would be unlikely that a great many cases would be reprosecuted, the
potential for such occurrences exists. In addition, two witnesses-
Mr. Charles Morgan, Washington Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union, and Mr. Barris-added that as they read the deci-
sion, the Supreme Court's holding in Strunk v. United States, 412
U.S. 434 (1973), requires dismissal as the only appropriate remedy in
cases where the right to a speedy trial is abridged, despite the ex-
treme nature of the remedy. With respect to the propriety of requir-
ing a permanent bar to future prosecution, the Committee adopts the
position of the American Bar Association as stated by the Advisory
Committee on their Commentary on Standards Relating to Speedy
Trial:
The position taken here is that the only effective remedy for
the denial of speedy trial is absolute and complete discharge. If,
following undue delay in going to trial, the prosecution is free to
commence prosecution again for the same offense, subject only
to the running of the statute of limitations, the right to speedy
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trial is largely meaningless. Prosecutors who are free to com-
mence another prosecution later have not been deterred from
undue delay. [Standards, Approved Draft, 1968. pp. 40-41.]
Pursuant to questions that arose during discussion of the dismis-
sal sanction, several points with respect to H.R. 17409 deserve clarifi-
cation: first, as already indicated above, dismissal is mandatory but
not automatic, since the defendant is expressly required under section
3162(a)(2) to move for dismissal if not brought to trial within the
prescribed time; second, it should be clear that the attorney for the
Government is free to contest the granting of a motion to dismiss on
the basis of error by noting his exceptions and taking appeal in the
proper manner; third, if this bill is enacted into law, it is contem-
plated that every defendant arraigned in Federal court be properly
advised of his right to speedy trial under this legislation, along with
the balance of his Sixth Amendment rights, prior to entry of plea.
This latter point is especially crucial in the unlikely but plausible
event the defendant is represented pro se at this juncture of the
proceedings.
86
The Carreon decision is clearly at odds with the legislative intent.
There is, as yet, little case law construing the Speedy Trial Act sanc-
tions. If the other circuits elect to follow the approach of Carreon, leg-
islative response from Congress may be forthcoming.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Jury Instruction on Entrapment Defense
In United States v. Nicosias7 the Seventh Circuit was requested to
overrule the principle established in United States v. Johnston8 8 that an
entrapment instruction may not be given to the jury unless the defend-
ant has admitted to the offense.89 Nicosia, a former mayor of East Chi-
cago, Indiana, was under grand jury investigation for accepting
kickbacks while in office. On the basis of certain conversations covertly
recorded by a government informer, Nicosia was ultimately indicted
for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. 9o At trial,
86. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7401, 7429-31 (italics in original; boldface emphasis added).
87. 638 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1980).
88. 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 114.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) provides:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communica-
tion, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the
United States or before any United States magistrate or other committing magistrate, or
any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who
may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magis-
trate or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any party or
witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such
court or examination before such officer, magistrate, or other committing magistrate, or
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Nicosia took the witness stand and identified the voice on the tapes as
his but denied that he had been trying to influence the informer. 9' Ni-
cosia's request for an entrapment instruction was denied. He was con-
victed and appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Noting that at least four other circuits had abandoned the John-
ston rule, and taking specific note of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Demma,92 the Sevehth Circuit admitted that Nicosia
"tempts a reconsideration of Johnston by [this] court." a93 However, the
court found the evidence insufficient to support an entrapment
instruction.
94
In dissent, Judge Swygert pointed out that the trial judge had
found that there was sufficient evidence to support an entrapment in-
struction and had only refused the instruction on the basis of the John-
ston rule.95 Judge Swygert noted that the Demma court had changed
its rule in order to align itself more closely with the pertinent Supreme
Court decisions.96 He also urged the court to consider the significance
of the District of Columbia Circuit's unanimous decision in Hansford v.
United States,97 which recognized that the alternative defenses of inno-
cence and entrapment are not inconsistent. 98 It is unfortunate that the
the Seventh Circuit did not take advantage of this opportunity to do
away with the outdated Johnston rule.
Admonishment of Courts and Prosecutors
In two cases this past term, the Seventh Circuit issued strong ad-
monitions to the district courts and federal prosecutors regarding mat-
ters of trial procedure. The opening words of United States v.
Rodriguez99 are illustrative of the court's attitude. Speaking through
Circuit Judge Wood, the court stated, "A federal prosecutor in final
on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein, or injures
any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or
injures any such officer, magistrate, or other committing magistrate in his person or
property on account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes,
or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration ofjustice, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
91. 638 F.2d at 972.
92. 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
93. 638 F.2d at 972.
94. Id. at 973.
95. Id. at 976 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
98. 638 F.2d at 979.
99. 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980).
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argument has done it again."' °  During his summation in Rodriguez,
the prosecutor stated to the jury that one of the defendants "has been
very quiet."10' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit construed this remark as
an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure to testify 0 2 and
the defendant's conviction was reversed.
In United States v. Delgado, 0 3 the defendant's conviction was re-
versed because the trial court had failed to ascertain whether the de-
fendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury
trial.1°4 The trial court had merely inquired if it was the defendant's
signature on the jury waiver, if he had voluntarily given up his right to
a jury, and if he had acted on advice of counsel.'0 5 In reversing, the
Seventh Circuit "advised" the district courts that they must explain to
defendants that a jury is composed of twelve members of the commu-
nity, that the defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, that a
jury verdict must be unanimous, and that if the defendant waives a jury
the judge alone will decide guilt or innocence.1
0 6
Fourth Amendment
In the 1980-81 term, the Seventh Circuit had a number of opportu-
nities to anticipate or apply several recent Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the fourth amendment. 0 7 In United States v. Cortina,0 8 the
Seventh Circuit used its supervisory power to quash a search warrant,
despite the fact that certain defendants' legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy had not been violated, finding that the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Payner'°9 was inapplicable. In United States v.
Acevedo, 110 the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of the degree of
exigency that is sufficient to override the warrant requirement for enter-
ing a residence to make an arrest. This question had been left unan-
swered by the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York."' In United
States v. Jimenez," 12 the Seventh Circuit applied the so-called "unwor-
100. Id. at 110.
101. Id. at 111.
102. Id. at 112.
103. 635 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1981).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 890.
106. Id.
107. E.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
108. 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.. 1980).
109. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
110. 627 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1980).
111. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
112. 626 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981).
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thy container" rule to affirm a conviction based on the search of a pa-
per bag. This approach to the requirement for a warrant in the search
of movable containers was rejected by the Supreme Court in Robbins v.
California"3 almost a year later, and the Supreme Court subsequently
vacated the conviction in Jimenez.
United States v. CortinaI14 involved an appeal by the Government
from an order suppressing evidence. As part of an investigation of two
race track messenger services, FBI Agent William Brown arranged for
Pamela Bridges, a former employee of Mr. Lucky's Messenger Service,
to become a paid FBI informer. Bridges met with Brown on several
occasions, and Brown kept a written record of the substance of their
conversations. In April of 1977, FBI Agent Linda Stewart presented an
affidavit for a warrant to search Mr. Lucky's, Finish Line Messenger
Service, and two individuals for evidence of an illegal bookmaking op-
eration. The affidavit recited "facts" which Agent Brown had allegedly
obtained from an informer known as "Source Number One." The affi-
davit alleged that "Source Number One," who was later identified as
Pamela Bridges, had been told by certain of the defendants that sev-
enty-five percent of both messenger services' business was handicapped
by the messenger services themselves and was never sent to the race
tracks for placement in the pari-mutuel wagering system. The affidavit
also alleged that certain of the defendants had told "Source Number
One" that they were in charge of handicapping and booking the wagers
that were not sent to the race tracks. On the basis of this affidavit, a
federal magistrate issued the requested search warrants. The warrants
were executed on April 22, 1977 and a large quantity of evidence was
obtained.
The two corporate and twelve individual defendants were subse-
quently charged in a fifteen count indictment with racketeering, extor-
tion, and illegal gambling. The defendants then filed a motion to
suppress the evidence which had been seized pursuant to the warrants.
This motion was accompanied by affidavits of several of the defendants
swearing that they had never said any of the things attributed to them
by "Source Number One" in the affidavit used by the Government to
obtain the search warrants. The defendants requested a hearing under
Franks v. Delaware to determine whether government agents had mis-
represented information in the affidavit used to obtain the search war-
113. 101 S. Ct. 2481 (1981).
114. 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).
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rants. " 1 5 The defendants' motion to suppress was denied on the ground
that the defendants had established only that "Source Number One"
might have lied or exaggerated when providing the information to the
FBI and not that the FBI had never received the information from the
informer at all.
On September 11, 1979, the day before trial, the Government de-
livered to the defendants Agent Brown's records of his conversations
with Bridges, a portion of an FBI administrative file, and a transcript of
Bridges' grand jury testimony. Examining this material, the defendants
realized that it was largely inconsistent with the facts attributed to
"Source Number One" in the affidavit used to obtain the warrants.
The defendants informed the trial judge and an evidentiary hearing
was held. Agent Stewart testified that she had drafted the affidavit re-
lying on Agent Brown's records and other information supplied by
him. Agent Brown then made admissions indicating that at least some
of the information he had supplied to Agent Stewart had not come
from his informer, Bridges, but had been fabricated by him. Bridges'
testimony confirmed Brown's admissions. She denied giving him much
of the crucial information he had attributed to her in helping Agent
Stewart prepare the affidavit. At the conclusion of this testimony, the
judge ruled that much of the information supplied by Brown was false.
Without this information, the Government conceded, the affidavit did
not demonstrate the probable cause required for the issuance of the
search warrants. However the Government argued that only the de-
fendant corporations and not the individual defendants had standing to
object to the search. The defendants responded that standing to object
to the search existed for all of the defendants under the supervisory
power of the federal courts. Without making any specific finding re-
garding standing to object, the district court granted the motion to sup-
press the evidence as to all the defendants.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the issue was whether the scope
of the court's supervisory power is circumscribed by the scope of avail-
able fourth amendment relief. Thus, the court had to decide whether a
defendant is required to show that his legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy were violated before he can avail himself of the court's supervi-
sory power. This issue was complicated somewhat by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Payner. 1 6
115. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
116. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). In Payner, agents working for the Internal Revenue Service had
broken into a hotel room and stolen documents from a subject's locked briefcase. These docu-
ments were subsequently introduced into evidence during the trial of Payner. Since the evidence
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In Cortina, the Seventh Circuit ruled that since all the persons
benefitting from the suppression order were defendants, they were all
entitled to the court's supervisory relief. The court interpreted Payner
as holding that no violation of a legitimate expectation of privacy must
be established by a particular defendant seeking to invoke the court's
supervisory power if the evidence is seized from another defendant.
However, this distinction between Payner and Cortina appears
somewhat strained when it is realized that Payner ultimately was no
less aggrieved by the Government's lawlessness than those defendants
in Cortina who had suffered no violation of their personal expectations
of privacy by the execution of the search warrants. Yet Payner, unlike
the defendants in Cortina, was afforded no relief. The Seventh Circuit
did, however, note that in Cortina a fraud had been perpetrated upon
the court and stated that that fact must be taken into consideration in
the exclusionary weighing process. Since Agent Brown's offense was
committed within the sanctity of the court itself, the Seventh Circuit
said the need for deterrence of illegal conduct was greater than in
Payner.
In United States v. Acevedo,11 7 the Seventh Circuit was called upon
to determine what constitutes exigent circumstances within the ambit of
Payton v. New York,' 18 in which the Supreme Court held that warrant-
less, nonconsensual entries into a suspect's dwelling in order to arrest
him violated the fourth amendment unless made under exigent circum-
stances. The contested entry of Acevedo's apartment was the culmina-
tion of an investigation that included a series of heroin sales between
agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration and a man named
Luis Ramos, an associate of Acevedo. On February 13, 1979, DEA
agents Adams and Collins met Ramos and drove him to a parking lot
on the north side of Chicago. Ramos left the car and walked towards
two adjacent row-type buildings. One of the buildings housed a tavern.
Ten minutes later, Ramos returned and sold the agents an ounce of
heroin for $840. On February 22, the agents met with Ramos again.
The agents expressed a desire to purchase a pound of heroin. Ramos
said he could not get such a large quantity until the next day but that
his source could supply an ounce of heroin for immediate sale. The
had been seized from someone other than defendant Payner, the Supreme Court ruled that Payner
could not assert that the illegal search violated any of his personal rights under the fourth amend-
ment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court's decision to suppress the stolen documents
under its supervisory power.
117. 627 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1980).
118. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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agents drove Ramos back to the same parking lot and Ramos again left
the car and walked towards the buildings. He returned shortly and
sold the agents a second ounce of heroin, this time for $825. Another
agent was nearby and had seen Ramos come out of the building imme-
diately adjacent to the tavern.
The next day, Ramos met with the agents yet again. He told the
agents that his source had only ten ounces of heroin available, and the
agents agreed to purchase that amount. Once again they all drove to
the parking lot next to the tavern. Ramos went into the tavern and
returned a short time later to inform the agents that his source was not
at home. Twenty minutes later, Ramos went into the tavern again, this
time accompanied by the agents. Ramos was then able to contact his
source by telephone. Acevedo soon arrived at the building adjacent to
the tavern. Ramos told the agents to wait in their car while he went
into the apartment to meet with Acevedo. After speaking briefly with
Acevedo, Ramos came out to the parking lot and told the agents that
his source had only three or four ounces of heroin available at the mo-
ment but expected to obtain an additional six ounces within two hours.
The agents agreed to an immediate purchase of four ounces, and Ra-
mos went back into the apartment. An agent looking through a win-
dow saw Acevedo take a small package from a table and hand it to
Ramos. Ramos then returned to the parking lot where he sold four
ounces of heroin to the waiting agents for $3,200. The agents then ar-
rested Ramos. Ramos immediately informed the agents that his source
was in the first floor apartment of the building adjacent to the tavern.
Ramos then accompanied six agents to that apartment. After the
agents knocked on the door and announced their office, they received
no response. They forcibly entered the apartment and saw that the
lights were on and a video tape machine was playing, but Acevedo was
not in the apartment. Ramos then suggested that Acevedo might be
upstairs in the second floor apartment from which he had recently
moved. Receiving no response after knocking on the door of that
apartment and announcing their office, the agents made another forci-
ble entry. Acevedo was found hiding in a closet and was arrested.
Acevedo was charged with distribution of four ounces of a mixture
containing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was con-
victed and was sentenced to three years in prison and three additional
years of parole. The district court found that Acevedo's arrest, though
executed after a forcible entry into his home without a warrant, was
lawful under Payton v. New York as a response to exigent
circumstances.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Acevedo's conviction.
The court began by noting that the District of Columbia Circuit had
anticipated the Payton result by a decade in Dorman v. United
States." 9 Dorman had enumerated a number of factors relevant to a
determination of whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless
entry into a suspect's home to arrest him for a felony. 120 However,
while conceding that some or all of the factors listed in Dorman may be
relevant to a particular case, the Seventh Circuit rejected a "checklist-
type" approach because of the limitless array of factual settings that
may arise. Instead, the court said that Dorman is better used as a guide
in determining whether those asserting the propriety of the warrantless
entry of a home have met their heavy burden in showing the need for
such an entry. 12 The court concluded that the Government had met
that heavy burden in Acevedo's case.
The court based this conclusion on two factors. First, the court
stated that the final transaction, in which one agent had seen Acevedo
hand Ramos a package, followed immediately by Ramos' delivery of
that heroin-containing package to other agents, was the first occasion
on which the agents had probable cause to believe that Acevedo was
dealing in heroin, and thus was the first occasion on which they could
have obtained a warrant. According to the court, the earlier transac-
tions had revealed only the apartment building from which Ramos was
probably securing the heroin he was selling to the agents. This being
the case, the other prong of the court's reasoning was that after taking
Ramos into custody, the agents faced a serious risk that Acevedo would
escape during time necessary to obtain a warrant. The court reasoned
that the agents' activities outside the apartment building had likely
alerted Acevedo that he might be arrested but that the agents' incom-
plete knowledge of the building's layout made it improbable that they
could be sure of securing all of the exits while a warrant was obtained.
The court also observed that Ramos' failure to return to the apartment
with the proceeds of the sale after he had been arrested by the agents to
whom he had delivered the four ounces of heroin "might have tipped
119. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
120. The following factors were listed in Dorman:
(1) Whether the suspect was accused of a "grave offense," particularly a crime of vio-
lence; (2) whether the arresting officer reasonably believed the suspect was armed;
(3) whether there was a "clear showing" of probable cause; (4) whether the arresting
officer had a strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises; (5) whether the
suspect was likely to escape if not immediately apprehended; (6) whether the entry was
peaceful; and (7) whether the entry was made during daylight hours.
435 F.2d at 392-93.
121. 627 F.2d at 70.
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Acevedo that Ramos had been arrested and that his arrest was immi-
nent."' 22 "Under these circumstances," said the court, "the agents
faced the choice, through no fault of their own, of acting immediately
to enter and arrest Acevedo without a warrant or risk not being in a
position again to arrest him."
1 23
The court's opinion leaves unanswered the question whether Ra-
mos had departed with the agents or returned to the building with the
proceeds following the first two sales of heroin. This, in turn, leaves
open to question the applicability of the considerations in United States
v. Kulcsar,124 cited in the court's opinion. If Ramos had not been ex-
pected to return immediately, it is considerably less likely than the
court implies that Acevedo would have been "tipped" and attempted to
escape. Had Ramos left the agents and gone into the apartment with
the money immediately after the first two sales, the Acevedo case would
fit within the reasoning expressed in Kulcsar. However, if Ramos, who
had been driven to the apartment building by the agents on both prior
occasions, had left with them on those occasions after procuring the
heroin, the Acevedo reasoning is considerably weakened.
It is not difficult to speculate, in this case at least, that the court's
finding of sufficient exigency to override the warrant requirement was
colored to some degree by the nature of the contraband being sold by
the suspect and its potential harm to society. Such a position has found
some support in several circuits. 125 The most disquieting aspect of such
an approach is its potential expansion. For example, should warrant-
less entry be approved under the exigency rubric if there is a mere re-
mote possibility of some harm to an informer whom the police have
conveniently placed in a dwelling occupied by a suspect whom they
wish to arrest?1
26
In United States v. Jimenez,1 27 the Seventh Circuit adopted a form
of the so-called "unworthy container" rule which would permit the po-
122. Id. at 71.
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. 586 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1978).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973).
126. In United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1980), the Eighth Circuit upheld a
warrantless police entry to "extricate" an informer who had negotiated a sale by undercover DEA
agents to a group of conspirators of a substance purported to be cocaine (but which was actually
an inert substance resembling cocaine). There was no expectation that any actual controlled sub-
stances were on the premises, and the court's finding of exigent circumstances was predicated on
the possibility that the conspirators might decide to harm the informer if they happened to dis-
cover that the cocaine was bogus. A universal adoption of such a ruling would potentially open
the door for warrantless police intrusions into almost any dwelling in which the police could
infiltrate an informer.
127. 626 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981).
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lice to dispense with a warrant to open and search "unworthy" contain-
ers such as paper bags.
128
The defendant in Jimenez had been placed under surveillance by
the DEA on the basis of information connecting her with large scale
drug transactions in the Chicago area. While watching the defendant,
DEA agents saw her park in the parking lot of a restaurant known to be
frequented by drug traffickers. Another car drove through the lot three
times and finally parked next to the defendant's car. The driver of the
second car handed a brown paper bag to the defendant. The defendant
locked this bag in the trunk of her car and drove away. The DEA
agents then stopped the defendant's car. One of the agents approached
the defendant and asked her what was in the bag she had placed in the
trunk. The defendant replied, "You know what it is." The agent then
opened the trunk and searched the paper bag, finding 40 one-ounce
packets of heroin. The district court refused to suppress the evidence,
and the defendant was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to
distribute over 1,000 grams of a substance containing heroin in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(l). In an earlier opinion, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the DEA agent had probable cause to search the trunk
of the defendant's car.
129
In a second opinion, the court held that the agent's search of the
paper bag found in the trunk of the defendant's car was proper. The
defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas v.
Sanders 30 mandated suppression of the bag and its contents. How-
ever, Sanders involved a warrantless search of a suitcase seized from
the trunk of an automobile, and the Seventh Circuit found that the
Supreme Court's decision to bar such a search was not dispositive in a
case where the container was a paper bag. The court acknowledged
that "a set of facts certainly may exist where an individual has a high
expectation of privacy in the contents of a box or perhaps a paper
bag."'' But the court found no such expectation of privacy in
Jimenez's case. Relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Neumann, 32 which had permitted a search of a cardboard box
128. See, e.g., United States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978). But see United States
v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(en banc).
129. United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1979).
130. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
131. 626 F.2d at 41.
132. 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978). In Neumann, the defendant was seen placing a cardboard
box into his car. The defendant's car was later stopped and seized, and the officers ifted the cover
of the box and saw illegal drugs. The court found that the defendant had an insufficient expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of "an unsecured cardboard box sitting in plain view in the passen-
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under somewhat similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
Jimenez search and affirmed the defendant's conviction.
Subsequent decisions by the Fifth and the District of Columbia
Circuits reached contrary results. 33 And, in Robbins v. California,13
4
the Supreme Court attempted to establish a "bright line" rule when it
said that a closed opaque container found in the trunk of a car may not
be searched without a warrant unless the shape or other characteristics
of the container were such that the contents could be said to be in plain
view. Shortly after the Robbins decision, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Jimenez, vacating the judgment and remanding the case to
the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Robbins.1
35
It would be easy to criticize the Seventh Circuit's failure to antici-
pate the Supreme Court's action in Robbins. But such criticism might
be premature at this time. The Supreme Court will hear argument this
spring in the District of Columbia's Circuit's Ross case,' 36 and the
Court has indicated that it may use Ross as a vehicle for reexamining
its decision in Robbins. 37 Given that only four justices joined in the
lead opinion in Robbins and that the Court's membership has changed
since that decision was handed down, it may very well be that Robbins'
demise is in the offing. If this proves to be the case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach in Jimenez may be vindicated.
CONCLUSION
With a few notable exceptions, the Seventh Circuit's criminal law
and procedure decisions during the 1980-81 term were generally quite
routine. Little new ground was broken, and the only trend that seems
apparent is a continuation of the court's pattern of highly conservative
ger compartment of an automobile" to justify extending the warrant requirement to the box.
According to the court:
[I]t was reasonable for the officers to promptly examine the contents of the box and later
to have the drugs properly inventoried and secured. This procedure protected the legiti-
mate interests of the arresting officers, including protection against unwarranted allega-
tions of theft or loss, and could well have protected the Neumanns in having their
property properly identified, safely kept and returned had not the box contained a con-
trolled substance.
Id. at 360-61.
133. United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
134. 101 S. Ct. 2481 (1981).
135. United States v. Jimenez, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981).
136. In United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), the District of Colum-
bia Circuit rejected the notion that defendants naturally must have a lesser expectation of privacy
in containers such as paper bags than in "worthier" containers such as suitcases.
137. See 50 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1982); 50 U.S.L.W. 2188 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1981).
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decisions. In the criminal law and procedure area at least, the Seventh
Circuit has not yet become one of the nation's leading courts.
